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A Note on M. Barbieri’s 
“Scientific Biosemiotics”
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A recent article in this journal
1 caught my attention, and prompted me 
to voice reservations I initially had reservations about voicing. Upon 
quoting the fairly noncommittal definition of the sign as nothing 
more than a triadic relation — “A interprets B as representing C”2— Mar-
cello Barbieri questions whether this (Peircean) model is still appropriate 
for the “extension of semiosis to the animal world and to the entire living 
world”. That statement, as it stands, is quite puzzling. What “extension” 
could he possibly be talking about, given the model’s wide applicability? 
If the definition contained some reference to strictly human use, professor 
Barbieri’s worry would make more sense. But it seems to me that something 
has gone amiss when one claims that the very thesis which warranted the 
study of non-human sign-use in the first place is not suited for the study of 
non-human sign-use.
If ever there was a case of ladder discarding, this is it.
Pondering this issue in greater depth eventually dispelled my puzzlement. 
When T. Sebeok wrote that “semiosis presupposes the axiomatic identity of 
the semiosphere with the biosphere”, the official narrative has been that he 
was carrying semiotics into bold new fields of application. Barbieri, however,3 
interprets Sebeok as rather limiting semiosis to a new enclosure. To be 
sure, this territory is far more expansive than the one Saussure originally 
envisioned. What matters is not the area allotted, but the fact that in either 
case the boundaries that were set reflect the comfort zone of a particular 
theorist, not the internal demands of an inquiry into signs proper. Barbieri, 
1. Barbieri 2008.
2. Barbieri 2008: 32, citing from Posner et al. 1997: 4.
3. Barbieri 2008, citing Sebeok 2001: 68.
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for example,4 produces a generic mathematical function “f(x) = y” and then 
promptly rejects the view, suggested by Taborsky,5 that would describe “f ” 
as an interpretant. No substantive reason is offered, other than that doing 
so would be queer, and would conflict with the assumption that semiosis is 
essentially something living things do.
Ask the average person and that person will likely tell you — quite confi-
dently — that signs consist in traffic signals and words. When the overarching 
notion of sign (as defined solely by a special type of relation) is presented to 
the public at large (and certain university departments), the standard reac-
tion, in effect, is that “that’s just crazy”. Nothing has hampered the growth of 
semiotics as much as its mission of overcoming this prejudice on principled 
grounds, precisely because it requires challenging strongly-held intuitions. 
It is disheartening, then, to see a biosemiotician declare that since “f(x) = y” 
does not conform to what he thinks a sign should look like, then the Peircean 
model is not for him and should be tailored accordingly.
But if in the end the best that one can do is point to certain unforeseen 
consequences of the triadic model and say “that’s just crazy”, then what the 
debate really boils down to is a contest of intuitions.6 What’s all this elaborate 
theorizing for, anyway, if unreflective inclinations are invested with a power 
to veto whatever upsets them? By that standard, Saussure’s linguistic angle 
at least had the virtue of saving more widespread intuitions. Indeed, the 
grip of “folk semiotic theories” is so implacable that John Deely believes7 it 
“unlikely that the practice of referring to the sign-vehicle simply as ‘sign’ will 
ever fall fully to desuetude”. Perhaps this is why Deely recently reported8 on 
a “would-be insurgency” whose goal is to “cast away everything that changes 
the playing field established by Saussure’s notion of the arbitrariness of signs”. 
Conservative adherence to Saussure’s foundational vision is, in Deely’s view, 
myopic (and I would very much agree).
Still, I fail to see, if one commits a grave mistake by identifying the triadic 
sign with its vehicular component, how does that same move become somehow 
praiseworthy when, as in Barbieri’s case, what is being latched on to is the 
interpretant? Professor Barbieri assumes without ado9 that “interpretation” 
is a macroscopic act which only “organisms that have a nervous system” can 
undertake. Again, most lay people would incline to agree. But “interpretation” 
4. Ibid. 33.
5. Taborsky 1999: 601.
6. For a survey of the questionable role of intuitions in abstract inquiries, see DePaul 
and Ramsey (1998).
7. Deely 2004: 17.
8. Deely 2006: 22.
9. Barbieri 2008: 33.
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in semiotics is a technical term, one which is assigned a strict definition, where 
the term “interpretant” replaces “interpreter”, in fact.
Not that there is anything inherently wrong with organisms having ner-
vous systems — I happen to have one myself. But a guiding methodological 
principle of any inquiry is to first slough-off all that does not directly bear 
upon the subject-matter at hand. Peirce, a logician trained in the attainment 
of maximal parsimony, ardently sought to avoid burdening the inquiry into 
signs with supplementary assumptions which, whether harmless or not, are 
nevertheless irrelevant (much in the same way that a general concept like 
“negative reinforcement” does not specify if a subject was accidentally or 
deliberately burned by fire or hit by a stick). Granted that the concerns of 
biologists are not simply the same as those of a logician; even so, to stipulate 
as Barbieri does that a sign is interpreted only if the transaction brings into 
play a nervous system is no better than saying that a sign is a sign only if part 
of it is spoken (Saussure’s pet dogma). Not only does this excess “folk” bag-
gage, while catering to “traditional” usage, do no explanatory work, it latches 
onto one component of the triadic sign at the expense of the others, a move 
which robs the adjective “triadic” of its very purpose.10 Barbieri thus defends 
the need for his code-based alternative only because he unwarrantedly grafts 
a handicap on the accepted triadic model, which is designed to elucidate any 
instance of semiosis, cellular or otherwise.
Barbieri opens the inaugural issue of the journal Biosemiotics by writing 
that11 “The first postulate [of biosemiotics] is the idea that semiosis is unique 
10. In a similar vein, no one has yet explained to me why, if Charles W. Morris betrayed 
the essence of Peirce’s semiotic by requiring the contribution of an interpreter (see Deledalle 
2001), Thomas A. Sebeok is somehow to be hailed as the vanguard of the Peircean project 
even though he made “being alive” a necessary and sufficient condition of semiosis — no mere 
“sop” this, but a veritable “buffet to Cerberus” (this remark, by the way, is an inkblot: does it 
mean a negative reappraisal of Sebeok’s semiotic, or a positive reappraisal of Morris’?).
11. Barbieri 2008a: 2. Although I’ve been made plainly aware of growing discomforts with 
this formula, I have taken it for granted that Marcello Barbieri — an Italian embryologist who 
currently occupies the position of Editor-in-Chief of the flagship journal Biosemiotics — speaks 
with enough authority to warrant my making some of his remarks the focal point of a brief 
critical commentary. For the record, here is what comes immediately before the foundational 
statement quoted: “The differences between the initial approaches, however, have not completely 
disappeared and survive to this day in the form of different ‘schools’ of biosemiotics. There is 
therefore a genuine pluralism in the field, but also a common goal. ... Today, there are at least 
two basic principles, or postulates, that are accepted by most biosemioticians and that represent 
a sort of ‘minimal unity’ in biosemiotics” (Barbieri 2008a: 2; emphasis added). Moreover, the 
formulation, I am told, was the fruit of concerted meetings and discussions held in Europe 
(“guilt by association” is, I’m afraid, a pitfall of association generally). To be sure, that doesn’t 
mean the current playing field is frozen in place, once and for all. But not only do I not see it 
as my business to rescue a project I disavow from its internal hardships, I actually think the 
idea that “semiosis is unique to life” (ibid.) enunciated by Barbieri captures quite faithfully T. 
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to life”. Casting this assertion in point form gives it an air of being scientific. 
But that rhetorical effect to the side, the postulate as Barbieri lays it down 
amounts to nothing more than a combination of unreflective metaphysics 
and primitive inclinations. As the literature on biosemiotics grows (as such 
enterprises are wont to do), the corpus’ mass will nevertheless leave wholly 
untouched the fact that at the heart of it all, at least for those who accept 
Barbieri’s construction of Sebeok’s view, lies an assumption which is as unde-
fended — and indefensible — as Saussure’s assertion that semiotics should 
study “la vie des signes au sein de la vie sociale” (1916: 33) — a tenet which 
also spawned many journals.12 Which of these competing “postulates” should 
one adopt? Well, to echo a famous saying, those who like this kind of thing 
will find it the kind of thing that they like. Not surprisingly, philosophers of 
mind hold that representation is inherently a mental phenomenon; linguists 
hold that it is social; biologists hold that it is organic; etc. So much for the 
(laudable) thesis that what essentially characterizes a sign is a relation patently 
indifferent to the ‘accidents’ that carve up such divisions.
These remarks are not to be taken as an endorsement of “pansemiotism”, the 
view that the universe consists exclusively of an action of signs. The situation 
is not such that anybody who dares call into question the pertinence of life 
for the study of signs ipso facto thinks rocks talk amongst themselves. Barbieri 
states matter-of-factly13 that whosoever adopts a more liberal construal of 
interpretation than he does perforce believes that “semiosis exists everywhere 
in the universe”. Such a false disjunction — with a straw man on one side and 
a promised land on the other — is both uncharitable and self-serving. At any 
rate, the supposed inference from triadicity to “pansemiotism” does not follow. 
To say that “A interprets B as representing C” may be noncommittal, but make 
no mistake: it does not necessarily include everything, and in fact excludes a great 
many things (most notably brute altercations occurring between two things).
Peirce insisted14 that a representamen must be capable of determining 
an interpretant which will “assume the same triadic relation to its Object”. 
Thus, any representamen which does its job of “renvoi” correctly stains by that 
very fact its interpretant with this semiotic role, such that the interpretant 
Sebeok’s original proposal (although, in fairness, Sebeok liked to keep his options open in a 
way Barbieri’s more dismissive comments do not mirror).
12. Asking for a review of the mounting primary and secondary literature on biosemiotics 
would therefore totally miss the point. It would be akin to a builder who, faced with some 
ominous cracks in the foundations, adds more storeys to the edifice in the hope of remedying 
the situation. Such a response, to my mind, is endemic of a bad (Kuhnian) epistemology, which 
basically holds that one can run a science on a little abduction and lots of ink.
13. Barbieri 2008: 33.
14. Peirce 1903: EP 2.272.
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in question is henceforth “capable of determining a Third of its own”15 and 
lead interpretation to the same object. This provides non-arbitrary theoretic 
constraints which robustly rule out candidates. If a sunflower turns westward 
and a marmot, not wishing to look at the sun, takes the sunflower as an index 
that the sun is setting, that marmot will be an interpretant if and only if some 
further party (whatever it is) could, without recourse to the sunflower, use the 
marmot (as a reliable information-carrier) to determine whether the sun is 
setting. The marmot in this example thereby qualifies as an interpretant — but 
not in virtue of its privileged biological constitution. As for the nondescript 
“further party”, it too must meet this criterion; nothing more is required.16
All of this can be rigorously established on semiotic (not biosemiotic) 
grounds which abstain from gratuitous metaphysical speculations. Now 
one may want to criticize all this, and such criticisms may be triggered in 
part because the theory in question clashes with one’s intuitions. But simply 
reporting the counter-intuitiveness one experiences when contemplating the 
proposal (i.e., that “that’s just crazy”) does not suffice. At the very least, such 
an emotional appeal does not square well with pretensions of scientificity.
Biology is broader in scope than linguistics; no one will dispute that. But 
directing attention to this uncontested feature and claiming that it somehow 
betokens an advance only masks the fact that “Semiotics is formally entitled 
to take possession of a theoretical heritage which has not been borrowed from 
outside for it was born from inside” (Eco 1979: 251), such that the predilections 
of established academic disciplines are irrelevant to a well-conducted inquiry 
into signs. Sadly, our poorly-institutionalized field has attracted a chaperon 
once again, as many semioticians now scramble to acquire in biology the cre-
dentials and idiomatic skills they would have erstwhile sought in linguistics.17 
In the short span between the decline of the linguistic paradigm and the rise of 
15. Ibid., EP 2.273; emphasis added.
16. Likewise, if from a mathematical function “f ” no one can ever determine, for any given 
value of “x” other than an original one, what “y” is, then that function cannot be an interpretant. 
If “pansemiotism” meant “anything goes”, then Barbieri could have just as easily used “1+5+67” 
as his example. Surely the description of “f(x) = y” as a semiotic triad, whatever its ultimate 
merit, enjoys greater motivation than saying that “5” is an interpretant in “1+5+67”. That a 
specific type of relation (and not others) was singled out by Taborsky (1999) attests to a rationale 
which is not haphazard, and suggests that such ventures are not completely devoid of prima 
facie interest or promise.
17. See for example Cobley 2008: 517. Just to be clear, this is not because biologists 
are domineering, but because semioticians have until now had a tendency to be insecure. If 
a physicist announced to mathematicians (whose abstract toolbox she employs) that they 
had to abandon irrational numbers because, say, the fact that no straightforward method of 
computation can be implemented makes such notions spooky, mathematicians would not 
comply — and this on principled (not just Kuhnian) grounds.
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the biological one, some of us have been fortunate enough to catch a glimpse 
of what semiotics could and should be: a confident inquiry in its own right.
I don’t want to be misunderstood: a “semiotics of life” is warranted, over-
due, and very much welcomed ( just as one can carry out a “semiotics of mind” 
without being mentalistic). In fact, preliminary investigations into the topic 
have already begun to enrich our view of nature’s complexity in a way that 
cannot fail to capture the attention of semiotician and scientist alike. But if 
the blueprint put forth in professor Barbieri’s article is any indication, all a 
“scientific biosemiotics” is bound to accomplish is “bouger le mal de place”.
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